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The genetic conception of
health: is it as radical as
claimed?
Alan Petersen
University of Plymouth, UK
ABSTRACT The so-called new genetics is widely predicted to radically trans-
form medicine and public health and deliver considerable benefits in the
future. This article argues that, although it is doubtful that many of the
promised benefits of genetic research will be delivered, an increasingly
pervasive genetic worldview and expectations about future genetic inno-
vations are profoundly shaping conceptions of health and illness and priori-
ties in healthcare. Further, it suggests that debates about the normative and
justice implications of new genetic technologies thus far have been
constrained by bioethics discourse, which has tended to frame questions
narrowly in terms of how best to ensure the protection and promotion of the
rights and freedoms of the individual. Sociologists and other social scientists
can help broaden debate in this field by exposing the assumptions underly-
ing the genetic conception of health and exploring the implications of associ-
ated developments.
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Researchers set to find ‘genetic signposts’ for eight diseases
One of the biggest projects ever undertaken to identify the genetic variations
that may predispose people to or protect them from eight major diseases is to
begin after receiving almost £9 million of funding from the Wellcome Trust.
The Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium (WTCCC) is a collaboration
of 24 leading human geneticists, who will analyse thousands of DNA samples
from patients suffering with different diseases to identify common genetic vari-
ations for each condition. It is hoped that by identifying these genetic signposts,
researchers will be able to understand which people are most at risk, and also
produce more effective treatments . . . (Newswise, 28 September 2005,
http://www.newswise.com/articles/view/514931/ (accessed 2 November 2005))
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‘Gene code-card’ will help doctors treat patients
A card holding patients’ genetic details could help revolutionise the way doctors
prescribe drugs, according to scientists in Israel. Researchers at Technion’s
Rappaport Faculty of Medicine and Carmel Medical Centre are examining ways
in which a patient’s genome – the entire genetic make-up – could be stored on
a card which a doctor could swipe onto a computer to help choose appropriate
medication. Team leader Professor Ariel Miller said such advances were ‘not far
off’ . . . (Guardian, 9 January 2006: 7)
News stories about new genetic innovations have become commonplace in
recent years. From the 1990s, in the wake of the Human Genome Project
(HGP), the HapMap Project and other ‘gene-mapping’ initiatives, there are
great expectations that genetics will radically transform conceptions of
health and illness and the nature of healthcare delivery in the future.
Genetic developments are said to hold the ‘key’ to ‘unlocking the secrets
of life’, and through enhanced understanding of disease processes, allow
control over life itself. Press coverage is replete with metaphors of ‘discov-
ery’ and stories of heroic feats, presenting a generally positive portrayal of
developments afoot (e.g. Conrad, 1999, 2001; Petersen, 2001, 2002; Kitzinger
et al., 2003; Holtzman et al., 2005; Petersen et al., 2005; Racine et al., 2006).
Editorials of science and clinical journals also reflect the high expectations
for genetics for the understanding and management of disease and antici-
pate important effects on healthcare, especially the healthcare professions
and on wider society (Miller et al., 2006). In the future, it is argued, medicine
will become ‘predictive’ and ‘personalized’, allowing identification of those
‘at risk’ of developing illness and the use of drugs ‘tailored’ to the genetic
profile of the individual. The Genetics White Paper, Our inheritance, our
future: Realising the potential of genetics in the NHS (Department of Health,
2003) outlines an array of applications of genetics in the NHS in the future,
including testing for single gene disorders, improving preventive and moni-
toring services for those at risk of developing disease and developing new
drugs and novel therapies. In public health, genetics is expected to find
applications in new strategies of prevention and risk-minimization, based
on a better understanding of the interactions between genes, environments
and lifestyles. According to public health experts, genetic epidemiology will
help disentangle the contributions of genetics to population health, assisted
through the formation of large-scale human genetic databases (‘biobanks’),
which are being established in a number of countries (see TRAMES, 2004;
Tutton and Corrigan, 2004; Critical Public Health, 2005, vol. 15, no. 5;
Petersen, 2005). Clearly, human genetics is a field rich in metaphor and full
of expectation. New forms of expertise are emerging and new institutional
arrangements and networks are being forged on the premise that genetics
will deliver what is promised. But are these promises likely to be fulfilled?
Is the genetic conception of health as radical as its proponents claim?
As I argue, although it is doubtful that many of the promised benefits of
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genetic research will be delivered, an increasingly pervasive genetic world-
view and expectations about new genetic technologies in the future are
profoundly shaping conceptions of health and illness and priorities in
healthcare. Concepts of the natural and the normal are being transformed
and consequently meanings of health and illness and disability. The increas-
ingly pervasive genetic worldview, I contend, is reinforced by a range of
policies and programmes and supported by diverse constituencies. This
article identifies some of these initiatives and interests and highlights a
number of implications of developments thus far. New genetic technolo-
gies give rise to many substantive questions, including: how should one
assess claims about their future applications and benefits? Do the poten-
tial benefits of the technologies outweigh the risks? What is the nature of
these risks and can they be adequately regulated? Are particular develop-
ments more worthy of support than others? Who is most likely to own and
have access to genetic data? What are the implications of technologies for
the distribution of resources in healthcare and public health? Which groups
stand to gain and which are likely to be disadvantaged by particular
developments? And, how are technologies shaping how we perceive the
body, health and illness, and self and society? Debate about the diverse
normative and social justice implications of genetic developments thus far,
however, has been constrained by the discourse of bioethics, which has
tended to frame questions narrowly in terms of how best to ensure the
protection and promotion of the rights and freedoms of the individual. As
I argue, sociologists and other social scientists can help broaden this debate
by exposing the assumptions underlying the genetic conception of health
and illness and exploring their diverse implications. While some important
social science contributions to the field of genomic/genetics have been made
in recent years, much critical deconstructive work remains to be done.
The reconfiguration of ‘nature’ and the conception of health
A major theme of social science work on human genetics in recent years
has been the potential, or perceived potential, of genetics to ‘reconfigure’
or ‘design’ ‘nature’ (e.g. Rose, 2001; Chapman and Frankel, 2003; Glasner,
2004; Glasner and Rothman, 2004; Jasanoff, 2005). The notion of a fixed
and immutable ‘nature’ separate and separable from ‘culture’ is seen to be
challenged by recent developments in genetics and other life sciences.
Technological advancement, so the argument goes, allows unprecedented
control over life processes and, by implication, over ‘natural’ events such
as disease, as suggested by innovations in the fields of genome mapping,
cloning and embryonic stem cell research. Science and media portrayals of
human genetic ‘breakthroughs’, such as those above, reflect a conception
of health as an ideal state of freedom from disease, the predominant causes
of which are seen to be due to ‘faults’ in the makeup of the human organism
(the genome). In this conception, the significance of ‘culture’, which shapes
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the institutions and environments which humans inhabit and which predis-
pose to disease (poor working conditions, polluted air, soil and water, ozone
depletion, lack of access to balanced diets, adequate healthcare, etc.) tends
to be ignored or assigned secondary importance to genes.
Adherence to the conceptual separation between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’
is in line with the view that social development and self-understanding
necessitate liberating humans from the constraints of nature (Rheinberger,
1995: 257). As some writers indicate, however, ‘nature’ has never existed
independently of its representations. Indeed, as Bruno Latour points out,
to speak of ‘nature’ and ‘its’ representations suggests that there could be a
domain of reality existing outside society, history and politics (2004: 32–41).
As has become increasingly evident, the concepts of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’
and how they are seen to be related varies through time and across contexts.
For example, in the early post-Second World War period, explanations that
strongly emphasized the influence of nature fell out of favour as a conse-
quence of widespread abhorrence to the Nazi eugenic programme.
However, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries there has been a turn
towards explanations of human health and social behaviour that empha-
size the influence of ‘nature’. In the field of social behaviour, the privileg-
ing of ‘nature’ over ‘culture’ is evident in the socio-biology of the 1970s
and, more recently, the rise of evolutionary psychology (Rose and Rose,
2000).
In medicine, increasingly, genetics is seen to provide the answer to the
‘riddle’ of disease; whereas in public health, it is seen to offer insight into
the status of the health of populations and to hold the potential for new
strategies of risk management. In many contemporary societies, the
increasing emphasis on ‘nature’ in explanations of social behaviour and
health corresponds broadly with the ascendance of neo-liberal philosophies
and policies, the liberalization of markets and attacks on welfare provision.
Processes of individualization, consumerism and the commodification of
the body and of healthcare constitute the preconditions for the emergence
of the genetic conception of health. Writing in the early 1990s, Miringoff
documented the rising significance of genetic explanations, or what she
terms ‘Genetic Welfare’, for a range of issues, at the expense of Social
Welfare, which has historically sought to improve human life by alterations
to the social environment through organizational and institutional change.
As Miringoff argued, matters of birth, death, disease, disability and quality
of life are increasingly subject to genetic interventions, which reflect a shift
in our vision of our abilities (Miringoff, 1991: 6). Since the early 1990s and
in the wake of the ‘mapping’ of the HGP and other genetic research
developments, a focus on genetic explanations for disease and behaviours
has intensified, reflecting an increasingly pervasive ‘bio-politics’ (Foucault,
1980). Although the notion of sovereignty as power over life has a long
history in the West (see Agamben, 1998), more and more biology is
becoming the basis for social classification and citizenship identification
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(Petryna, 2002; Rose and Novas, 2005). The growing number of patient
support groups organized around particular genetic conditions would seem
to confirm Paul Rabinow’s (1992) observation on the emergence of new
forms of ‘bio-sociality’ and citizenship. Increasingly, patient groups
organize and work to advance the interests of those who share an identity
based on the common experience of having a genetic condition. Such
groups often have close links with and share the goals of health
professionals and lobby for research into particular genetic conditions (see
Mackta and Weiss, 1994; Rapp, 1999).
The wide appeal of genetic explanations can be explained by their reso-
nance with broader discourses on self and society. The notion that genetics
defines one’s identity and one’s destiny is deeply rooted in the dominant
western cultures, in discourses of individuality and individual responsibility
(liberalism and humanism), biological differences in human types and
diseases ‘running through families’. The idea of the genetic ‘fingerprint’, the
unique biological identifier that can be used to identify the dead body, the
missing person, a biological relative or perpetrator of a crime has become
widespread since 1986, when the technology was first used to solve a widely
publicized British murder case (Nelkin and Andrews, 1999: 191). A number
of cases since then have relied heavily on evidence derived from DNA
samples, often resulting in the conviction of the accused. For example, the
conviction in December 2005 of Bradley John Murdoch for the murder of
British tourist Peter Falconi in the Australian outback relied heavily on
DNA evidence from the T-shirt of the accused, believed to be deposited in
the course of attacking Falconi’s partner, Joanne Lees. (At the time of the
trial, Falconi’s body had not been found; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Peter_Falconio#Prosecution_evidence (accessed 16 January 2006).)
The promise of ‘personalized’ medicine
For pharmaceutical companies, the idea that a single ‘faulty’ or ‘defective’
gene may cause disease has strong attraction, since it implies the need for
a diagnosis through a simple gene test and then treatment with drugs. The
field of pharmacogenetics, which promises to offer drugs ‘tailored’ to the
individual’s genetic makeup (e.g. Herceptin for severe breast cancer) is
claimed to be moving rapidly into the clinic, assisted by the prodigious
networking of the pharmaceutical companies and, in the UK at least, efforts
to change the culture of genetic testing within the healthcare system
(Hedgecoe, 2004: 106–21). Science and news media portrayals of genetic
discoveries and technology ‘breakthroughs’ reinforce the impression that a
range of new, ‘personalized’ genetic applications is ‘just around the corner’
(Petersen, 2001; Holtzman et al., 2005; Miller et al., 2006). In October 2005,
for example, the journal Nature reported that Japanese companies had
developed a machine that would allow doctors to check patients’ DNA
from a single drop of blood before writing a prescription (Cyranoski, 2005).
Petersen: The Genetic Conception of Health
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Interestingly, the announcement came very soon after the publication of a
report from the UK’s The Royal Society, which argued that pharmacoge-
netics had been ‘overhyped’ and that its implementation will be a ‘gradual
rather than revolutionary process’ and that it will take 15 to 20 years to
live up to its promise in clinical practice (Royal Society, 2005: 41). Media
reports and science commentators rarely question the feasibility or desir-
ability of such developments or ask whether ‘consumers’ want such drugs
and who is likely to have access to them and at what cost. A number of
normative and justice issues arise from this field, including, apart from those
of access to drugs, the distributional affects associated with investments in
the field and the adequacy of established procedures of informed consent
(Hedgecoe, 2004: 166–73). The development of ‘personalized’ medicine
arguably compounds a more general medicalization of phenomena and the
tendency for pharmaceutical companies to turn otherwise healthy popu-
lations into patients (Moynihan and Cassels, 2005; Law, 2006). The develop-
ment of pharmaceuticals for specific population groups, particularly ethnic
and racial minorities, whom, it is asserted show different responses to
certain drugs, also raises the question about the potential for pharma-
ceuticals designed for one group to be used for germ-line intervention
designed for such a group, with eugenic outcomes (Duster, 2003: 174). These
issues are likely to become acute if ‘personalized’ medicine ever reaches a
stage of development where it is able to be ‘mainstreamed’ into healthcare.
The ideal of ‘personalized’ medicine is compatible with an increasingly
market-driven and commodified healthcare system. The individual is
expected to take the initiative in relation to their own healthcare and risk
management, monitor their bodies, diet if deemed necessary, take regular
exercise, avoid ‘risky’ behaviours, take appropriate preventive action and,
in cases of illness, manage illness ‘successfully’ (Frank, 1995). Access to
‘adequate’ information about one’s genetic health status and about treat-
ment options in healthcare is seen to provide the precondition for
‘informed choice’. The expectation is that those who are currently well
(the ‘pre-symptomatic’ ill) who have a family medical history for a disorder
should undertake gene tests for that disorder where these are available
and track risk through the family by ‘drawing the family tree’ (Petersen,
1999). Self-management is facilitated through ‘direct-to-consumer’
marketing and the sale of ‘over-the-counter’ genetic tests, thereby effec-
tively bypassing the clinician and taking diagnosis and, in some cases, treat-
ment directly to the individual via the Internet and High Street. In recent
years, single gene tests have been developed for a range of conditions,
including cystic fibrosis, haemophilia, Tay Sachs disease, thalassaemia,
inherited haemochromatosis and inherited breast and ovarian cancer.
Recently, however, the value of many such tests has been questioned, with
claims that they are often ‘rushed to market’ without studies to prove they
benefit patients (Sample, 2006: 5). Concerns have also been raised about
whether ‘consumers’ can be considered to be adequately ‘informed’ when
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information deriving from tests is probabilistic and decision making occurs
without adequate counselling support and/or under tight constraints of
time (Malinowski, 1994).
Criticisms of and opposition to developments
This ‘geneticization’ of health and healthcare has not occurred without
critical comment and outright opposition. Commercial involvement in
genetics research, and the associated commodification of the body and its
parts, has been an issue of considerable concern to many people (Whitt,
1998; Boyes, 1999; Hansen, 1999; Pálsson and Har ardóttir, 2002). Worries
about ethics and privacy, potential discrimination against disabled people,
discrimination in employment and insurance, possible misuse of samples
for cloning or other questionable purposes, and profiteering by pharma-
ceutical and biotechnology companies have been revealed by opinion polls
(Everett, 2003) and focus groups with lay publics (Wellcome Trust and
MRC, 2000). Efforts by companies to patent genes linked to particular
diseases, for example Myriad Genetics’ (USA) securing of a European
patent related to the BRCA1 breast cancer associated gene and to monop-
olize the market in gene testing, has been challenged by doctors, researchers
and a number of governments (Gottweis, 2005: 198–9). NGOs, such as
Britain’s GeneWatch UK, disability groups, feminist scholars and right-to-
life groups, are among those who have also raised questions about the appli-
cations and implications of new genetic developments, such as genetic
testing, pharmacogenetics and cloning research.
The assumption held by many proponents of new genetic technologies
that ‘consumers’ are unequivocally supportive of and will welcome these
technologies is questionable. In the UK, in 2002, the Human Genetics
Commission undertook a review of and consultation on genetic testing
services provided directly to the public. This revealed confusion about
genetic testing, and concerns about commercial interests seeking to
promote nutritional and other products, confidentiality of test results and
about what such results might mean for insurance premiums (Mayor, 2003).
The UK’s GeneWatch has raised concerns about unregulated genetic
testing on the Internet and High Street, for example in relation to the
accuracy of information and the potential harms posed without proper
advice and counselling (GeneWatch, 2002). Publics’ and activists’ concerns
about genetic testing are shared by some policy makers. In Australia,
marketing of genetic tests direct to the consumer was recently considered
by the Australian Law Reform Commission and the Australian Health
Ethics Committee as part of their inquiry into the legal and ethical issues
surrounding the protection of human genetic information. In response, the
Australian government recommended ‘regulat[ing] more effectively in vitro
diagnostic devices used in genetic testing provided directly to the public’
as well as ‘health related home use genetic tests’ (ALRC and AHEC, 2005).
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As some commentators have argued, positive results from such tests are
difficult to interpret since some of those who carry a mutation linked to a
disease do not develop the disease. In prenatal testing and testing for ‘late-
onset’ conditions, questions have been raised as to whether it is valid and
‘safe’ for individuals to make decisions about termination or medical treat-
ments or life plans (e.g. whether or not to start a family) on the basis of a
genetic test alone. With breast cancer, for example, tests for BRCA1 and
BRCA2 mutations linked to the disease can neither predict whether women
will develop breast cancer, nor reveal information on the possible age of
onset, severity or course of the disease (Byravan, 2004). However, some
researchers and healthcare workers have suggested prophylactic bilateral
mastectomy (i.e. the removal of both breasts) for women deemed ‘at risk’
of breast cancer, as indicated by tests showing they have a mutation
(see, for example, breastcancer.org, http://www.breastcancer.org/research_
genetics_013105.html (accessed 15 January 2006).
The premise that the implications of genetic tests are limited to the indi-
vidual who is tested can be challenged. The inheritable nature of conditions
means that, in medical treatment, ‘the patient’ is not just the individual but
the whole family (Richards, 1996). Women tend to bear most responsibility
for tracking genetic risk within the family and may experience guilt and
anxiety in relation to past, present and future generations that may be
affected by a genetic condition (Hallowell, 1999). Family members’ rights
in relation to privacy and the implications of knowing versus not knowing
one’s diagnosis are concerns that have been raised (see, for example, Mali-
nowski, 1994; Chadwick et al., 1997). Although the demands and dilemmas
facing people whose conditions have been diagnosed as ‘genetic’ would
seem to be similar in many respects to those facing people with other health
conditions, knowing that one’s condition is inheritable and may be passed
on to others is likely to pose particular demands on those affected. These
may become salient at certain critical junctures, such as when individuals
are planning to have children or when they meet a partner (Parsons and
Atkinson, 1992; Cox and McKellin, 1999; Petersen, 2006). At such times,
issues of identity, risk and responsibility for others are likely to take on
heightened significance. Recognizing that genetic information is qualita-
tively different from other medical information (‘genetic exceptionalism’),
some writers have argued that the use of genetic tests requires special
consideration in relation to informed consent, privacy and provision of
healthcare (Suter, 2001; Green and Butkin, 2003).
The claim that genetic tests will provide the basis for a ‘predictive’
medicine is also questionable. As Holtzman and Marteau (2000) point out,
the complexity of the genetic basis of most common diseases will mean that
it is unlikely that genetics will allow the prediction of disease in the
future. Except for some rare conditions of ‘high penetrance’, such as Hunt-
ington Disease, increasingly it is recognized that social and physical environ-
ments and lifestyles play a role, and perhaps a more significant role, in
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determining diseases. Focusing on the genetic basis of disease diverts atten-
tion from the potentially major contribution of these factors and the
necessity for collective responses to health problems. As Evan Willis (2005)
argues, there is a tension between the individual and collective interests in
the uptake of new genetic technologies. While there may be opportunities
arising from an increased understanding of the genetic basis of disease, an
overemphasis on genetic contributions can lead to the neglect of the
environmental factors that may influence the overall incidence of disease
in the population. For example, the incidence of cancer is widely known to
be linked to a host of non-genetic factors, including pesticides, radiation,
organochlorides, diet and exercise, a fact that can be obscured by the
‘geneticization’ of cancer (Epstein, 1998, 1999). The idea that diseases are
‘caused’ by single gene mutations is reinforced by the newspaper press and
other media, with almost daily stories of new gene ‘discoveries’, ‘finds’ and
‘links’, frequently including predictions by cited or quoted scientists of
imminent new treatments. These stories almost invariably neglect consider-
ation of non-genetic and ‘multifactorial’ explanations for disease, involving
the interactions of multiple genes and environments (Petersen, 2001; see
also Conrad, 1999). The view of genes as causative can lead to a blaming-
the-victim approach to treating illness and the stigmatization of the ill:
illness is seen as an inherent failure of the individual rather than an outcome
of an ‘unhealthy’ social or physical environment.
Finally, a number of critical scholars, particularly those working in the
field of disability studies, have warned of the potential for the routine use
of genetic technologies in healthcare to lead to eugenics ‘through the
backdoor’ (Duster, 1990; see also Allen, 1996). As Shakespeare (1998)
comments, while there may be a rhetorical commitment in healthcare
towards individual choice, this is likely to be compromised in a healthcare
system where screening is extended to the whole population and there is
an emphasis on efficiencies. Economic pressures create imperatives to
screen out the unhealthy and the disabled. Thus, the ‘weak eugenics’ of the
current health system, which is an outcome of ‘reproductive selection via
non-coercive individual choices’, may gradually shift towards ‘strong
eugenics’, which characterized the coercive population policies of an earlier
period (Shakespeare, 1998: 669). Other disability scholars have also warned
of the devaluing of the lives of the disabled and the prospect of discrimi-
nation arising from an emphasis on prenatal testing for genetic ‘defects’
(e.g. Newell, 1999; Ward, 2005). In genetics-based medicine, ‘the right to
choose’ available to some may inadvertently lead to the restriction of the
rights or life chances of others through selective reproduction (eugenics),
discrimination against those diagnosed with conditions or the creation of a
genetic ‘underclass’ (Rifkin, 1998; Kelly, 2005). Duster’s (2003) warning in
relation to pharmacogenetics’ focus on specific population groups, noted
earlier, has particular pertinence here. The use of ‘new’ in ‘new genetics’
may serve rhetorically to mask an affinity and continuity with the
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programmes and practices of the ‘old’ eugenics; that is, the same selective
outcomes may be achieved via new mechanisms (Petersen, in press). None
of these outcomes are inevitable, of course, but they are potential impli-
cations that have been identified by critics and commentators of the new
genetics and need to be acknowledged and become part of public and policy
deliberations in this field.
Genetic conceptions of population health
Debates thus far have focused predominantly on medical knowledge and
practices; that is, on how genetics will change conceptions of disease and
healthcare at the level of the individual and in the clinic. Less explored
have been the implications of a growing genetic worldview for population
health. In the 1990s, health professionals and policy makers increasingly
focused their attention on the genetics of whole populations, through
studies seeking to map genetic diversity in different groups and to ascer-
tain the contributions of genes, environments and lifestyle to health. A
field of public health genetics began to emerge, informed by the discipline
of genetic epidemiology (see Khoury et al., 2000). The promise is that
greater understanding of gene–environment–lifestyle interactions will lay
the groundwork for new medical treatments and preventive measures
‘tailored’ to the needs of subgroups with particular genetic characteristics
(e.g. Khoury, 1996: 1720; Zimmern, 1999: 137). Most discussion within this
field, however, has concentrated on the potential for new medical treat-
ments with relatively little discussion of environmental measures for the
so-called genetically ‘susceptible’. Indeed, in public health genetics,
‘environment’ is an ill-defined concept, and often used as a synonym for
‘lifestyle’. The uptake of genetic knowledge in public health threatens to
challenge traditional conceptions of public health with their focus on
changes to host–environment–agent relations via alterations to living and
working conditions and changes in lifestyles (Petersen and Bunton, 2002:
96–8).
The recent rapid development in a number of countries of population-
wide human genetic databases, dubbed ‘biobanks’, comprising DNA data
along with personal medical and lifestyle information, is perhaps the most
obvious manifestation of the concern with the genetic health of populations.
The emergence of biobanks reflects widespread belief among health
professionals and policy makers in the potential of genetic epidemiology
eventually to untangle the genetic and non-genetic contributions to disease.
The concept of a database that includes genetic and personal information
is not entirely new. Registers of patients with genetic diseases have been
established in a number of countries for more than 30 years (WHO, 2002:
113–14). However, the scope, format and size of the new generation of
genetic databases is unprecedented, sometimes including the entire popu-
lations of countries. In recent years, a number of countries have developed,
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or announced their intentions to develop, biobanks, including Iceland,
Estonia, Japan, France, Sweden, Canada (Quebec), USA, Australia and the
UK.
Although biobanks vary in their organization and mix of personal and
genetic information, they tend to share the goal of searching for ‘suscepti-
bility genes’ for complex diseases in order to improve health and medical
care and stimulate local economies (see, for example, Martin, 2001; Austin
et al., 2003; TRAMES, 2004; Tutton and Corrigan, 2004; Petersen, 2005).
National pride and competition and proponents’ concerns to exploit the
benefits of the so-called biotech revolution are ‘drivers’ of many develop-
ments. For example, in a medical newsletter published in 2005, a supporter
of the developing Western Australian Genome Health Project wrote that
the project will ‘position WA biomedical research as a world leader by capi-
talising on the amazing resources – 30 years of health data on the entire
population as well as the maternal and child health research database
(McEvoy, 2005). Arguments for people’s participation in biobank projects
are often couched in terms of future benefits for the health of ‘the public’,
with strong appeals made to ‘genetic solidarity’ and ‘altruism’ (HGC, 2002;
Wellcome Trust et al., 2003). (On this, see Petersen, 2005.) In making the
case for why people should participate in UK Biobank (which, in January
2006, announced its intention to begin recruiting within ‘weeks’), Chief
executive of UK Biobank, Rory Collins commented that: ‘We are asking
people to donate an hour of their time plus samples to establish the causes
of diseases’, adding ‘it’s a gift, and they get no information back, good or
bad’ (Coghlan, 2006: 8). In the early establishment phase of UK Biobank,
proponents emphasized the economic and scientific benefits of the project
and fears about the economic and political risks of the UK not being
involved when other countries were (USA initiatives in the area were
noted) (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology,
2000). Similar benefits have been claimed for the Icelandic Health Database
and the Estonian Genome Project.
With the urgency to develop biobanks, little attention has been paid to
how research data are likely to be used, who will own data and whether
projects are likely to represent a good use of resources. Ethics discourse in
this area has tended to limit discussion to the issue of informed consent, as
though this were the main or only issue worth consideration (Petersen,
2005). The broad governance implications have not been extensively
studied thus far. (A notable exception is the research of Herbert Gottweis
and his colleagues at the University of Vienna, who, at the time of writing,
is completing an international study exploring the rise of biobank initia-
tives as an aspect of a transformation of health policy, biomedical govern-
ance, and biopolitics. See http://www.univie.ac.at/transformation/Elsa/
ELSAenter.htm (accessed 26 January 2006).) Such collections, it is clear,
pose considerable challenges for established conceptions of ethics and
governance, particularly given the long-term prospective nature of research
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and uncertainties about research uses and applications (Petersen, 2005).
Some projects, such as the Icelandic Health Database, which includes
patient information for the entire country, have been the focus of concerns
about commercial involvement and ‘selling off’ the country’s genetic
heritage (Pálsson and Rabinow, 1999; Pálsson and Har ardóttir, 2002). At
the same time, however, such collections have served to generate some
debate about identities – for example, among Icelanders about the exist-
ence of a shared ‘Viking gene’ (Pálsson, 2004) – emphasizing the contem-
porary significance of genetics to self-definition.
As with medical genetic applications, however, the development of such
resources has given rise to concerns and some opposition. In 2004, the
Icelandic project was judged to be unconstitutional after citizen complaints
that the project fails to offer personal privacy to participants (McKie, 2004:
2). In the UK, ‘consultation’ workshops undertaken by UK Biobank
revealed unease about genetic research in general and worries about this
particular project, including commercial involvement, possible misuse of
samples for cloning or other questionable purposes, potential discrimi-
nation against disabled people, loss of participants’ anonymity, profiteering
by pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies and employers and
insurers gaining access to information and misusing it (Wellcome Trust and
MRC, 2000: 3–4; People Science and Policy Ltd, 2002) Some scientists and
critics of the venture have expressed reservations about its methodology,
including reliance on incomplete medical records and participants’ recol-
lections of past behaviour and exposure to environmental risks. One fear
is that incomplete data on lifestyle and environment will lead to a bias
towards ‘over-emphasising the genetic influence on disease processes
because it is the only thing on which Biobank will provide hard data’; i.e.
genetic reductionism (Gibson, Hansard 3 July 2003).
In the USA, a biobank project announced in 2004 by the National Human
Genome Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland, aims to overcome the
problem of using unreliable environmental data and the results from
medical misdiagnoses by using microchip devices placed around partici-
pants’ bodies in order to keep a continuous check on their heart rate and
blood oxygen levels, exposure to radiation, consumption of food, alcohol
and tobacco and so on (Coghlan, 2006). This implies forms of surveillance
and intrusion into people’s lives that are likely to be judged unacceptable
to many people, even if it can be assumed that individuals would wish to
be involved in a project of little apparent value to themselves. The prospect
of surveillance may become acute as biobanks begin to share data – a
prospect that has been increasingly discussed by some co-ordinators of
biobank projects.
Concerns about population-based genetic research, in particular under-
lying assumptions about the genetics of differences of ‘race’ and ownership
of DNA, have been also raised in relation to international ‘gene-mapping’
initiatives such as the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP) and the
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HapMap Project. According to their proponents, these projects constitute
resources that can be shared among scientists worldwide. The former
project, launched in 1991 by a group of population geneticists, with the goal
of ‘mapping’ diversity in hundreds of human so-called ‘isolated’ populations
through cataloguing similarities and differences between them, has been
especially controversial, having been criticized on the basis of poor science
and racism (M’Charek, 2005). The project aimed to generate cell lines and
DNA from blood, hair or saliva samples taken from geographically diverse
populations with distinct cultures and language in order to gain insight into
current genetic diversity and its evolution as well as the history of human
migration throughout the world. Geneticists argued that it would also
advance understanding of genetically inherited disease, though this was a
secondary objective (M’Charek, 2005: 3). Indigenous groups protested at
the outset of the research programme, including in relation to issues of
patenting and the commercial exploitation of DNA. The project was
accused of ‘bio-colonialism’, ‘bio-pirating’ and ‘prospecting’ and was
dubbed by the World Council of Indigenous Peoples as the ‘Vampire
Project’ (M’Charek, 2005: 13; see also Petersen and Bunton, 2002: 164–6).
The HapMap project, launched in 2002, as a follow-up to the Human
Genome Project and designed to trace genetic variation within the human
genome, is more directly focused on human health. This also has its critics,
though has been less contentious than the HGDP. The genetic determin-
ism underlying large-scale projects of this kind, and their failure to deliver
promised treatments, are among criticisms made (Gottweis, 2005: 196).
According to its webpage, the HapMap project is,
a partnership of scientists and funding agencies from Canada, China, Japan,
Nigeria, the United Kingdom and the United States [who aim] to develop a
public resource that will help researchers find genes associated with human
disease and response to pharmaceuticals.
Further, the project ‘is expected to be a key resource for researchers to use
to find genes affecting health, disease, and responses to drugs and environ-
mental factors’. It is claimed that information will be ‘released into the
public domain’ (http://www.hapmap.org/ (accessed 26 January 2006)). The
website outlines how ethical concerns will be addressed, including protec-
tion of privacy, and acknowledges potential problems, including the
‘undermin[ing of] established cultural or religious traditions or legal or
political status’ and the potential for stigmatization and discrimination,
arising from the ‘misinterpretation’ of information arising from the project.
The assurances offered about attention to ‘community engagement’ and the
project’s commitment to ‘greater openness and trust’ suggest that lessons
have been learnt from the HGDP.
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Bioethics discourse and critical social science
The attention paid to ‘ethics’ in the HapMap Project is indicative of a more
general increased attention to ethical considerations in genetic research
beginning in the 1990s. The HGP was a significant factor contributing to
the development of bioethics discourse, with a small proportion (around
5%) of the budget allocated to ELSI (Ethical, Legal and Social Impli-
cations) initiatives. However, during the late 1990s and early years of the
20th century a growing number of ethics committees, commissions and
workshops have addressed the ethics of new genetic developments. For
example, in the UK, the Human Genetics Commission was established in
order to advise the Government on the implications of developments in
this field. Recently, sociologists and some other social scientists have begun
to analyse the assumptions and implications of bioethics knowledge and
practice (e.g. Evans, 2002; Haimes, 2002; Corrigan, 2003). Evans (2002),
among others, has argued that ethics’ reliance on the frameworks of moral
and analytic philosophy and on commissions and on matters of formal
procedure has served to ‘thin’ debate on substantive issues, such as the
direction of research and the ownership of knowledge. The use of certain
legitimized mechanisms (e.g. focus groups) in ‘public consultations’ and the
appeal to the language of citizenship in arguments for people’s participation
in projects, evident for example with UK Biobank (see Petersen, 2005), may
serve to divert attention from considerable widespread concerns and objec-
tions to genetic research. Issues of politics and power, the political economy
of genetic science and technologies, and the specifics of time and place are
obscured by the focus on the application of abstract, universal principles to
issues; i.e. ‘principlism’ (Evans, 2000).
Bioethics discourse reflects and legitimizes particular conceptions of
health and illness and healthcare. The predominant focus of bioethics on
the promotion of individual autonomy, particularly through the protection
of rights (e.g. informed consent) serves to reinforce a particular view of the
‘normal’ individual and of what is required to achieve optimum health and
wellbeing. For example, the bioethics debate surrounding ‘the right to know
versus the right not to know’ (Chadwick et al., 1997) reveals a culturally
and historically specific view of individuality; i.e. the person as a relatively
unconstrained rational decision maker and information processor. In this
conception, constraints of socio-economic background, ethnicity, gender
and so on, tend to be overlooked. This view of the individual is consistent
with the broader construction of the ‘health consumer’ within increasingly
de-regulated healthcare systems (Henderson and Petersen, 2002). Troy
Duster (2003) refers to the ‘trained incapacity’ of bioethicists, philosophers
and those working in clinical fields to appreciate the social, economic and
political dimensions of problems. As he argues,
There is an overwhelming tendency for ethicists, medical specialists, clinical
geneticists, philosophers, and the best-intentioned guardians of a notion of rights
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and obligations in Western societies to concentrate their ethical gaze on the states
of minds and physical conditions of individuals – to the near exclusion of the
fate of the social groupings to which individuals belong. (2003: 157)
The limitations of bioethics in addressing the unique challenges posed by
genetics and other biotechnology developments, however, are becoming
increasingly evident. In particular, there is a need to broaden debate about
the diverse implications of proposed and existing developments. It is here,
I would contend, that sociologists and other social scientists with an interest
in new genetic developments have a key role to play.
Given its critical, relativizing stance, sociology is especially well placed
to offer insight into the normative and social justice implications of genetics
and other biotechnology developments (DeVries and Subedi, 1998: xiii).
As DeVries and Subedi note, ‘A sociological approach lifts bioethics out of
its clinical setting, examining the way it defines and solves ethical problems,
the modes of reasoning it employs, and its influence on medical practice’
(1998: xiii). Genetic research and development concerns the fundamental
issues of life and death and life chances, the implications of which urgently
need the insights of sociology and other social science disciplines. The
potentially far-reaching implications of new genetic developments, some of
which have been outlined in this article, call for in-depth analysis and critical
commentary, including in relation to the politico-economic aspects of
developments and to the question of who benefits and who is disadvan-
taged from the use of particular technologies. The emergent sociology of
bioethics is a welcome move towards a more explicitly normative approach
to new genetic and other biomedical technologies. A major challenge
confronting sociologists and other social scientists is how they may develop
this work so as to contribute usefully to debate and policy-relevant work
in this field in the years ahead.
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